Showing posts with label risk management. Show all posts
Showing posts with label risk management. Show all posts

Thursday, February 12, 2009

Sorry, the Bar is Closed

Today's Federal Register contains this tidbit - perhaps not totally unexpected.
--------------------------------------
ACTION: Notice of proposed
rulemaking.

Regulated Navigation Areas;
Bars Along the Coasts of Oregon and Washington

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes to establish Regulated Navigation Areas (RNA) covering specific bars along the coasts of Oregon and Washington that will include procedures for restricting and/or closing those bars as well as additional safety requirements for recreational and small commercial vessels operating in the RNAs. The RNAs are necessary to help ensure the safety of the persons and vessels operating in those hazardous bar areas. The RNAs will do so by establishing clear procedures for restricting and/or closing the bars and mandating additional safety requirements for recreational and small commercial vessels operating in the RNAs when certain conditions exist.


If you want to read it all, click here.

Comments - Once again, I think the USCG is passing a new regulation as a knee jerk reaction to a single, isolated case; specifically, the case of Captain Oba who defied the Coast Guard's orders and attempted to cross the Umpqua River Bar. [read details here at Professional Mariner]. A snip from the proposed regulation:

Bar restriction. Passage across the bars located in the
regulated navigation areas established in paragraph
(a) of this section will be restricted for recreational
and uninspected passenger vessels as determined by....


So, the new regulation specifically targets uninspected passenger vessels, 6 pack charters, T boats, recreational boats etc. Oba was operating a 6 pac charter on his 38' Bertram. Here is the dumb part: the Coast had closed the Umpqua River Bar before Oba attempted his crossing, and the fool tried it anyway, resulting in the deaths of 3 of his passengers. Accounts of the incident indicate that the USCG contacted Oba numerous times to warn him off, and the offical record does say that the CG had "closed the bar" before the tragedy. [earlier post on this]

So, my question is this: Does this proposed new regulation mean that when the USCG closes the bar, it's really REALLY closed?

Monday, January 12, 2009

Weather, relatively speaking

My post on the sailors who where towed by the USCG after departing into some lousy weather received a number of comments, and I was surprised that most of the comments were to scold me for "being to harsh" in my criticism of the MOONSHINE's crew. (No one challenged the idea that the USCG might charge for services in cases like this.)

Too harsh?!? I should have gone on more about how astounding (arrogant? ignorant?) it was for a sailboat crew with plans to cross from Rhode Island to Puerto Rico to claim that some misfortune of bad weather had abruptly ended their voyage. The weather they encountered was a winter gale, with winds 35-40kts and seas 8-12'. Those conditions are certainly not enough to end the voyage of anyone who's planning includes even the most basic understanding of what one might be expected when, you know, you are planning to cross the ATLANTIC FREAKIN' OCEAN!

To put some perspective on the weather encountered by those sailors, I present the following video, taken by Steve and Linda Dashew [CLICK HERE TO WATCH]. As you listen to Linda's narration, you will hear her say that they have been waiting for gale force conditions, so they could shoot some video and test their boat. Their weather? Steady 35kts, gusting 50, seas averaging 15'-20' with larger swells. Watching this video, you might imagine that a nice hot lunch was about to come up the companionway ; knowing the Dashews, I'll bet it did.

Please don't bother to point out the differences between the WINDHORSE at 83' and the MOONSHINE, at 45' -- both boats are ocean capable -- the difference that separates the two stories is the crew. I don't think the crew of the MOONSHINE would even have been able to get the WINDHORSE to Puerto Rico. Had video of a Nor'east snow storm been their objective, I dare say the Dashews would have no problem sailing the MOONSHINE south on the very same day that caused the MOONSHINE's actual crew to call the USCG.

In some respects, bad weather is relative. Once you've sailed in 45kts of wind, 25kts is just another day sail; once you've been in 60kts, 45kts is just another gale. Weather that caused one crew to activate their EPIRB is an just an opportunity to shoot some good footage to a different crew. It is their experience that allows the Dashews to confidently wait for a good gale before heading into the Tasman Sea to take some video of gale force conditions. The MOONSHINE crew were completely out of their league and had to call for rescue just 25 miles into their 1600 miles voyage. It wasn't a "bad storm" that caused the problems for MOONSHINE, it was that relative to their experience, the conditions seemed like a bad storm to them.

The apologists point out that the MOONSHINE's engine failed and the sails were ripped. I believe that those issues are a matter of poor maintenance and lack of seamanship rather than a direct result of a fresh gale. A photo of the boat after she was towed clearly shows the mainsail furled on the boom, and it doesn't appear to be damaged.

Look, we all know what happened: this skipper's bad weather strategy was to lower the sails and motor. We see this all the time from inexperienced coastal cruisers. They either don't understand how to or are not equipped to reef, and can't control the boat under full sail, so they motor. Well, with 10' seas, its likely that the fuel was stirred up, fouled the filters with sludge and that was all she wrote. Remember, this boat was heading south with NE winds. You are telling me that he couldn't make way with a reefed main?

Here is where my ire surfaces: the fact that the captain of the MOONSHINE didn't have enough experience to understand what he was in for does not give him a pass. To say "Aw, shucks Doug, give the guy a break" implies that what happened was somehow beyond the control of the captain. To cut this guy any slack is to ignore the facts; that captain chose to leave a safe port, so he placed himself in circumstances that were completely within his control. He flagrantly ignored or disobeyed every tenet of prudent seamanship and to excuse his behavior as a landlubber is to insult the truly lubberly.

My brother has done a fair bit of ocean sailing, and when the subject of getting caught in bad weather comes up, he says "You can only pick your weather on the first day of any crossing."

Wednesday, September 17, 2008

Are You Prudent?

Mariners speak of prudence all the time. What would the prudent mariner do? We criticize poor judgement when we say "he failed to do the prudent thing." This week, David Brooks of the NYT wrote a column about politics - completely unrelated to anything maritime. But he wrote two paragraphs defining prudence that are so concise and elegant that they deserve to be repeated here for all the prudent mariners reading RedRightReturning.


What is prudence? It is the ability to grasp the unique pattern of a specific situation. It is the ability to absorb the vast flow of information and still discern the essential current of events — the things that go together and the things that will never go together. It is the ability to engage in complex deliberations and feel which arguments have the most weight.

How is prudence acquired? Through experience. The prudent leader possesses a repertoire of events, through personal involvement or the study of history, and can apply those models to current circumstances to judge what is important and what is not, who can be persuaded and who can’t, what has worked and what hasn’t.


"It is the ability to grasp the unique pattern of a specific situation." That sentence sums it up beautifully, doesn't it? To recognize that something is different; either in what you expected, or that the event is outside your previous experience. I like that he connects the unique pattern to a specific situation. The prudent mariner must evaluate every situation on its own, and resist the tendency to be complacent when things get too familiar.

[read the entire column here] warning - this op/ed piece is decidedly and pointedly political and may cause some fans of RRR distress.

Sunday, August 31, 2008

Bad Doug!

Yeah, everyone who wrote and mentioned that I wasn't wearing my PFD while working off the North Reef at night is absolutely correct in pointing out my very poor behaviour and bad example. I should have had one of these on, which was hanging in my wheelhouse. I urge everyone to wear one, and I am guilty of not wearing it every single time....and I really should have had it on during that night on the nasty north reef. My bad.

I will strive to wear it from now on, promise!